This chapter considers historical evidence and frameworks regarding entrepreneurial groups, 
Introduction
To many observers, a focus on entrepreneurial groups -or, more colloquially, venture 'founding teams' -is a thoroughly modern pre-occupation. It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s that scholars in business management and policy began to question the image of the heroic individual found in traditional treatments of entrepreneurship. Writing in the Harvard Business Review, the economist Robert Reich (who would become Bill Clinton's Secretary of Labor six years later) argued that "to compete effectively in today's world, we must begin to celebrate collective entrepreneurship" rather than "the traditional myth of the entrepreneurial hero " (1987: 78) .
Some management thinkers had touted the importance of 'team entrepreneurship' as much as a decade earlier (e.g. Timmons 1975 Timmons , 1979 . But a new generation of scholars were the first to call for a systematic program of research that would document the prevalence of entrepreneurial groups, describe their properties, and assess their impact on business performance (e.g. Kamm et al. 1990; Gartner et al. 1994) . In a review of developments in entrepreneur research and theory, Gartner and colleagues (1994: 6) noted that "the 'entrepreneur' in entrepreneurship is more likely to be plural, rather than singular". They offered an expansive definition of the entrepreneurial group, which included owner-managers, investors, organizational decision-makers, family members, advisors, critical suppliers and buyers as possible candidates in the entrepreneur role.
In this chapter, I suggest that the historical evidence and frameworks that can be deployed to study entrepreneurial groups are far less recent than the contemporary literature would seem to suggest. Indeed, the social sciences evidence a long pedigree of research on entrepreneurs, broadly construed, as well as on the collective nature of activities oriented toward the creation of new organizations (Ruef and Lounsbury 2007) . The goals of the chapter are twofold. First, it offers a selective history of entrepreneurial groups, addressing the legal origins of commercial partnerships in Roman and medieval law, the elaboration of partnership systems in the Mediterranean region during the Renaissance, and the evolution of entrepreneurial groups during the industrial revolution. Second, the chapter traces the intellectual origins of social scientific work on entrepreneurial groups. I emphasize four classical perspectives, in particular: (Tajfel and Turner 1979) which also draws on earlier research on in-group and out-group comparisons (e.g. Bass and Duntemann 1963) . Despite the utility of social identity theory for understanding group dynamics, I restrict my attention to those historical social science perspectives that sought to address the process of entrepreneurial association even when they were first formulated. In the concluding section of the chapter, I suggest how these perspectives continue to raise questions that animate contemporary research on entrepreneurial groups.
1 A fifth classical perspective, Max Weber's ideal-types of commercial partnerships, will be addressed in my review of historical evidence on entrepreneurial groups.
Historical Evidence

From the Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution
The German sociologist Max Weber (1864 Weber ( -1920 Ages to commercial partnerships, as joint households were not only defined in terms of kinship ties, but also in terms of cohabitation and 'communities of labor' (e.g. craft guilds).
In broad strokes, then, what Weber was identifying theoretically in the HCP were a set of institutional conditions that would allow for the social construction of entrepreneurial groups:
partnerships that had a legal, economic, and social existence apart from the entrepreneurs that constituted them. A concrete example in this respect involves his comparison of medieval commendas, or trade associations (see Lutz, pp. 22-27, in Weber [2003] ). In the unilateral commenda, investment capital was only provided by a single party, while in the bilateral commenda, investment came from (at least) two parties (see Figure 1 ). Each organizational form involved both a commendator (or passive investor) and an entrepreneur known as a tractator.
The unilateral commenda differed, however, in that all of the financial risk was born on the part of the passive investor, who contributed to a fund that would be managed by the tractator, serving as his or her agent. In contrast to prevailing legal wisdom, Weber (2003: 135-136) argued that the lack of a separate fund in the unilateral commenda meant that it was not an institutional precursor of modern partnerships. Indeed, the weak organizational foundation that the unilateral commenda provided for entrepreneurial ventures led to its eventual replacement by simpler financing arrangements, such as commercial loans. The bilateral commenda, by contrast, allowed for the existence of a fund that was separate from the assets of investors and entrepreneurs and, therefore, served as a legal template for modern partnership forms.
[ Insert Figure 1 About Here ]
By the time of the Renaissance, Europe witnessed not just the emergence of a precursor of modern partnerships, but also of "partnership systems": autonomous firms (either sole proprietorships or partnerships) that were connected together through a single or small group of entrepreneurs. As Padgett and McLean (2006) As the legal history of partnerships attests, entrepreneurial groups have been a prominent feature of Western capitalism since its origins, even predating it according to some definitions.
During the late Middle Ages, associations of businessmen already thrived in the Mediterranean region. These groups were not simply a reflection of economic growth, but an important catalyst as well. In thirteenth century Italy, the historian Thomas Blomquist (1971: 157-158) has argued, "the favored method of doing business … was through association: at all levels of business, capital and/or labor were pooled in order to realize a maximum economic potential". Whether the primary purpose of such associations was to achieve "maximum economic potential" is a (1963: 53) . The combination of business partners and workers from different status ranks at the same physical site led to "a curious mixture of commerce and gentility" in these enterprises (p. 54).
The legal forms available to entrepreneurial teams evolved considerably during the 19 th century. At the beginning of the century, entrepreneurs who sought to found a venture together had little choice but to create a business partnership --or to seek a special charter from a legislature that would allow them to incorporate their enterprise under public auspices (Lamoreaux 1998) . Over the course of the succeeding decades, the diffusion of general laws of incorporation in the United States and Europe greatly simplified the chartering of corporate entities. Aside from the obvious implications of the corporate form for the liability of business owners (which was far more limited than in commercial partnerships), it also had crucial implications for the longevity and governance of entrepreneurial ventures. As suggested by
Taylor's Lyonnaise example, partnership agreements tended to end after a fixed period of time and they also tended to be dissolved by the death of one of their members. The corporation, by contrast, was "more commonly chartered in perpetuity" and its life "was independent of that of any of its stockholders" (Lamoreaux 1998: 66) . In terms of governance, the autonomy of an owner of the corporate venture to act on behalf of the organization was also severely limited compared to the simpler business partnership. The legal view of these entrepreneurial groups evolved only gradually over the century: at the beginning of the 1800s, "the view that corporations were artificial creatures of the state held sway; by the middle it was increasingly common to view corporations as private contracts made by 'aggregations' of businessmen; by the end, the courts were moving toward the view that corporations were legal persons in the eye of the law" (p. 67). These institutional developments thus represented a culmination of the evolutionary process whose legal origins were already identified by Weber in the late medieval period.
Historical Diversity in Entrepreneurial Groups
While much of the historical literature on commercial partnerships has emphasized associations among male participants, entrepreneurial groups have likewise played an important role for women. In 19 th century Britain, women comprised roughly a fifth of all entrepreneurs, with a particularly strong concentration in the garment trades (Nenadic 1998) . Because these businesses often relied on "the cultivation of 'dovetailed' effort whereby the income-producing activities of one related woman reinforced and supplemented those of another" (ibid: 633), kinship-based co-partnerships represented the dominant form of organization. For instance, in Stana Nenadic's sample of fifty-three female-run Edinburgh garment firms, more than 80% depended on kin co-partnerships, most commonly sibling or mother-daughter teams. Partnerships among male entrepreneurs in the same city were less common.
Considering the importance of entrepreneurial groups in the West, one might also ask whether a similar influence can be identified during the emergence of Asian capitalism. Here the historical evidence is more difficult to interpret, given the unique pathway taken by these economies vis-à-vis the occident. In Japan, entrepreneurial activity in the medieval Buddhist economy was undertaken by monasteries and temples (Collins 1997 This is the topic that I turn to next.
Historical Perspectives
Simmel's Structural Sociology
Georg Simmel (1858 Simmel ( -1918 was a contemporary of Weber and early proponent of structural sociology, a forerunner of modern network analysis. He had a particular interest in interpersonal associations, which he described as the "form (realized in innumerable, different ways) in which individuals grow together into units that satisfy their interests" (1917 [1950] : 41).
These units comprised a diverse set of groups, including social gatherings, religious sects, military alliances, extended families and (most notably for our purposes) business partnerships.
While Simmel devoted considerable attention to the simplest structural arrangements -dyads and triads -he also maintained that structural sociology should account for the origin and composition of larger groups. It was in these settings, he maintained, that an "autonomous, super-individual unit" (Simmel 1908a (Simmel [1950 ) transcends the individual personalities involved and confronts members as an objective structure. Like Weber, Simmel was thus intrigued by groups as an intermediate building block between individual persons and formal organizations.
In Simmel's work, a tension between autonomy and constraint is evident even in the simplest of entrepreneurial partnerships. Considering dyads of business partners, he noted that:
"… The formation and operation of the business rests, exclusively perhaps, on the cooperation of these two personalities, nevertheless the subject matter of the cooperation, the business or firm, is an objective structure. Each of the two [entrepreneurs] has rights and duties toward it that in many respects are not different from those of any third party.
And yet this fact here has another sociological significance …. Because of the objective character of the economic system, business is intrinsically separate from the person of the owner, whether he be one or two, or more persons." (Simmel 1908a (Simmel [1950 : 132)
The question of the legal separation of a business from the entrepreneurs that create it -the central concern for Weber's historical analysis of entrepreneurial partnerships -was taken-forgranted in Simmel's structural sociology. In Simmel's mind, this fact alone was enough to fundamentally differentiate the social psychological dynamics of entrepreneurial dyads from other dyadic relationships, such as monogamous marriage.
Elaborating on this perspective, Simmel suggested that the addition of a third participant in a group created new tensions and opportunities. When the other two participants had limited prior affiliation or interpersonal trust, an individual who comprised the third element of the triad could assume the role of a broker or intermediary. A broker with self-serving motivations was identified by Simmel as the tertius gaudens (or the "third who enjoys"), since s/he could derive benefit from potential conflict between the other two members of the group (Simmel 1908a (Simmel [1950 : 154-155). In contemporary structural sociology, this arrangement is seen by Ronald Burt as a defining characteristic of entrepreneurial activity: "when you take the opportunity to be the tertius, you are an entrepreneur in the literal sense of the word -a person who generates profit from being between others … [E]ntrepreneur refers to a kind of behavior, the tertius is a successful entrepreneur" (Burt 1992: 34) . Recent work on entrepreneurial groups has documented the impact of the tertius role on economic inequality within business partnerships.
In one nationally-representative sample of U.S. founding teams, the equity share held by participating entrepreneurs was significantly higher when they assumed brokerage positions, mediating between weakly connected partners (Ruef 2009a) . Consistent as well with Simmel's intuitions, however, the exercise of the tertius strategy was not appropriate in all contexts. As he (Simmel 1908a (Simmel [1950 : 159) argued, "the advantage accruing to the tertius derives from the fact that he has an equal, equally independent, and for this reason decisive relation to two others" (italics added). Where entrepreneurs serve in a mediating position between their spouses or kin, who are co-owners in a startup business, and other partners, their lack of independence can lead to strong norms against the "divide and conquer" strategy of the tertius. Indeed, the empirical evidence for the U.S. suggests that entrepreneurs do not derive a greater equity stake in such contexts than would be expected in the absence of brokerage opportunities (Ruef 2009a) .
Aside from his analysis of the tertius gaudens, Simmel's work has other implications for contemporary work on entrepreneurial groups. His essay on "The Stranger", for instance, highlighted the relationship between outsider status and middleman entrepreneurs, who make a living from intermediate trade between otherwise closed societies (Simmel 1908b (Simmel [1950 ). These middleman entrepreneurs are distinguished by their contact with diverse segments of society, but lack an "organic" connection, "through ties of kinship, locality, and occupation, with any single one" (ibid: 404). A theoretical implication that follows from this claim is that an in-group affiliation bias should be sustained among middleman minorities, despite their regular contact with out-group members (typically, in the role of customers or suppliers). Recent statistics on homophilous (in-group) affiliations in entrepreneurial partnerships tend to support this contention. Among U.S. startups in 1998, for instance, the rate at which minority entrepreneurs formed new businesses with members of their own ethnic group was over 800 times the rate expected under a model of random mixing, while the comparable rate for white entrepreneurs was over 100 times random expectations (Ruef et al. 2003 : Table 9 , Model 3).
In other work, Simmel highlighted the effect of group size and composition on cohesiveness. He argued that group "solidarity decreases in the measure in which numerical increase involves the admission of heterogeneous individual elements" (1908a [1950] : 95).
Again, his theory bears directly on modern conceptions of entrepreneurial groups, particularly the tension between a desire for functional diversification and the interpersonal conflict that may result from team heterogeneity (Ensley 1999) . This paradox -which also pertains to top management teams more generally (Amason 1996) -was anticipated by Simmel in terms of "the disadvantages for cohesion and unity" following from increases in group size, coupled with the "advantages of nearing [functional] completeness" (ibid).
Following Simmel, structural sociology moved in two (quite distinctive) directions, each of which bears on the analysis of entrepreneurial groups. One direction involved the post-World War II development of sociometry, the formal methodological toolkit for collecting data on and analyzing social networks (see Wasserman and Faust 1994 for a systematic overview). While network analysts, on the whole, only gradually recognized the relevance of their framework for entrepreneurial behavior, it is now well-established that "most forms of entrepreneurship are centered around firms and interaction rather than around the activities of a single, heroic actor" (Swedberg and Granovetter 2001: 12-13) . Some crucial theoretical milestones in the development of this relational view of entrepreneurial groups have been Mark Granovetter's (1985) influential statement on the "embeddedness" of economic life and Burt's (1992) conceptualization of the "network entrepreneur", both of which exhibit a strong Simmelian pedigree.
The other direction is the relationship of social structure outside of the organization to the internal dynamics of the entrepreneurial venture. Arthur Stinchcombe's path-breaking (1965) essay re-ignited sociological interest in this topic, emphasizing the fragility of entrepreneurial groups that formed without the benefit of pre-existing relationships that could be imported into startup enterprises. For entrepreneurial teams, "the process of inventing new roles, the determination of their mutual relations and of structuring the field of rewards and sanctions ...
have high costs in time, worry, conflict, and temporary inefficiency" (1965: 148). These problems of organizational learning are compounded because "new organizations must rely heavily on social relations among strangers" (149), producing networks within the group that may be threatened by a lack of interpersonal trust. Stinchcombe argued that these problems could be mitigated by institutions -such as universalistic laws and contractual instruments -that enforce agreements developed among strangers.
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In both the modern network and macro-structural treatments of entrepreneurship, we continue to see the sociological concepts (e.g. the 'tertius gaudens', the 'stranger') introduced by Georg Simmel. His legacy has had a far-reaching effect on the structural analysis of entrepreneurs and groups. Some contemporary analysts of entrepreneurial phenomena frame their analysis explicitly in Simmelian terms (Burt 1992 (Burt , 2000 Ruef 2002; Aldrich and Kim 2007) . In other cases, such as the wide-ranging literature on social networks and business founding (e.g. Baker and Nelson 2005; Renzulli et al. 2000) , the intellectual debt is palpable yet unstated. What seems clear is that our understanding of the structural features of entrepreneurial groups -including size, diversity, in-group bias, brokerage, and potential for conflict --would be diminished without Simmel's pioneering work.
Coase's Theory of the Firm
The theory of the firm developed by the British economist Ronald Coase (1910-) is widely recognized as a cornerstone of modern institutional economics. Nevertheless, at first glance, its implications for entrepreneurial groups may seem far from obvious. Oliver
Williamson, Coase's most influential and active proponent, writes that the theory of the firm highlighted the fact that, in addition to the price mechanism of the market, the "economic system is also made up of subsystems, of which the large corporation is a conspicuous member" (1993:
3, italics added). When we survey the contemporary literature on the governance of firms, much of it is devoted to the analysis of large and mature enterprises (see David and Han [2004] for a review). Closer scrutiny of Coase's seminal work suggests, however, that in both terminology and content, there is much effort to address the nature of the entrepreneurial firm. Moreover, contemporary economic work on the formation of entrepreneurial partnerships has drawn extensively from Coase's inspiration.
The 'Nature of the Firm' (1937) considers two "co-ordinating instruments" in the economy -one being the price mechanism and the other being the "co-ordinating function of the 'entrepreneur' " -and asks "why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in another" (p. 389). The central feature of Coase's response, now well rehearsed by students of transaction cost economics, is that the price mechanism imposes costs on market exchange (through problems of contract enforcement, monitoring, and the like) that can be alleviated by the entrepreneur who is coordinating similar transactions within the business firm. The 'transactional' view, in turn, leads Coase to his definition of the firm, which "consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur" (Coase 1937: 393) .
When this system of relationships involves a set of other entrepreneurs, then Coase's definition circumscribes the boundaries of the entrepreneurial group. The size of the group "becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organised by the [focal] entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he [sic] abandons the organisation of such transactions" (ibid). Coase defines the process of combination as an event "when transactions which were previously organised by two or more entrepreneurs become organised by one" and contrasts this with integration, which "involves the organisation of transactions which were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on a market" (397-398). As in all facets of the theory of the firm, the decision as to when an entrepreneur should seek out combination or integration (and, thus, form a venture with greater transactional scope) depends on the costs of organizing, the likelihood that the entrepreneur will make 'mistakes' that would otherwise be corrected in the market, and the economies of scale that accrue to the entrepreneurial group.
By most accounts, Ronald Coase's article only exercised a limited influence in the decades after it was published (see Coase 1988 for a retrospective). Even after its resuscitation
by Williamson in the 1970s, the initial impetus of transaction economics steered the theory of the firm away from small, entrepreneurial ventures (Williamson 1975 (Williamson , 1985 . Nevertheless, recent applications have highlighted the relevance of Coase's ideas for entrepreneurial groups. In a model of the allocation of rights in venture capital contracts, for instance, Thomas Hellmann (1998) proposes that the willingness of an entrepreneur to give up control rights to an outside investor (e.g. permitting the replacement of the entrepreneur by a professional manager) is partially a function of the entrepreneur's wealth constraints and equity stake. As in Coase's formulation, the decision also hinges on the relative productivity of entrepreneurs (e.g. ability to achieve low organizing costs) compared to professional management (Hellmann 1998: 60 (1985), which addresses the implications of opportunism, bounded rationality, and incomplete contracting for the allocation of control rights in business firms. Their approaches differ from TCE insofar as they consider features of entrepreneurial groups (e.g.
founder replacement, revenue sharing) that tend to be ignored in Williamson's focus on mature businesses.
One of the most explicitly historical efforts to develop Coase's ideas in order to understand entrepreneurial partnerships can be found in Avner Greif's (2006) influential text on medieval trade. As Greif points out, a central problem in long distance mercantile exchange at the time was the reliance of entrepreneurs on overseas agents, a contractual partnership fraught with uncertainty and potential for theft or malfeasance. One possible solution -emphasized in other treatments of these partnerships (e.g. Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986) -is that these mercantile relationships would only be reliable if they were constructed on the basis of a "natural group", the family. Like Coase, Greif sought to identify other institutions and organizational arrangements that were able to reduce the transaction costs inherent in these affiliations.
A response that arose serendipitously among the (Jewish) Maghribi traders in the 11 th century was the creation of a reputational mechanism that reflected past mercantile conduct. As Greif writes (1989: 862) , "the Maghribi traders did not establish a separate religious-ethnic community ... nor did they represent a 'natural' group, which binds together individuals in all (or at least most) important aspects of their lives". But these traders did operate on a repeated basis through business associates and, in that process, constituted an informal entrepreneurial groupwhich Greif terms a "coalition". The Maghribi coalition was sustained by several institutional mechanisms, few of them sanctioned formally by law in the medieval states of the Mediterranean basin. Perhaps foremost among these, according to Greif, was an implicit contract that governed the relationships among coalition members. Maghribi traders agreed to only employ other coalition members as agents and to pay them a premium for their mercantile services. In addition, "all coalition merchants agree [d] never to employ an agent who cheated while operating for a coalition member" and were permitted to cheat any trader who had previously cheated a member of the coalition (Greif 1989: 868) 
Olson's Theory of Collective Action
Mancur Olson (1932 Olson ( -1998 ) is often credited with introducing the analysis of groups with shared interests into economics. In his classic book on the Logic of Collective Action, Olson addressed the "free rider" problem, whereby the contributions offered by group members toward collective goals decline with increases in group size. 3 The free rider problem tends to arise in groups, such as entrepreneurial teams, where access to collective rewards (e.g. startup profits) is defined in advance and, for any given group member, is not contingent on their subsequent effort.
A strong version of this dilemma applies when entrepreneurial groups formally specify ownership shares (and other benefits) early in the startup process based only on the ostensible competencies and traits of owner-managers, with little provision for sanctioning entrepreneurs whose subsequent investment of time, ideas, or other resources falls short of expectations. More commonly, there is not a complete "impossibility of exclusion" from collective goods (Hardin 1982; Oliver 1993) , since business partnerships retain some ability to remove lackadaisical participants from the group. Still, the process of exclusion from the group imposes sufficient burden and turmoil that the free rider problem remains highly salient even in these contexts.
Given the assumptions that (a) group members cannot be excluded from collective benefits (at least not without burden) and that (b) those benefits are produced jointly through the actions of group members, Olson argued that rational individuals would engage in shirking behavior, especially within larger groups where the link between individual effort and collective outcomes was less tangible. Applying his theory to business partnerships, in particular, Olson wrote:
"The fact that the [business] partnership can be a workable institutional form when the number of partners is quite small, but is generally unsuccessful when the number of partners is very large, may provide another illustration of the advantages of smaller groups. When a partnership has many members, the individual partner observes that his
[sic] own effort or contribution will not greatly affect the performance of the enterprise, and expects that he will get his prearranged share of the earnings whether or not he contributes as much as he could have done. The earnings of a partnership, in which each partner gets a prearranged percentage of the return, are a collective good to the partners, and when the number of partners increases, the incentive for each partner to work for the welfare of the enterprise lessens." (Olson 1971 (Olson [1965 : 55) In Olson's perspective, there are compositional features of social groups that serve to mitigate the free rider problem. Particularly important, in this respect, are social incentives that encourage individuals to contribute, even when they might otherwise be inclined toward free riding. Olson distinguishes between groups bound by strong pre-existing social relationships and those that lack such interpersonal ties: "if a small group of people who had an interest in a collective good happened also to be personal friends .... and some of the group left the burden of providing that collective good on others, they might, even if they gained economically by this course of action, lose socially by it, and the social loss might outweigh the economic gain" (ibid:
60). Part of the reason that strong social networks are crucial to mitigating free riding is that they offer selective incentives to individuals that must not be explicitly agreed upon or paid for by other members of the group. As a consequence, these social incentives avoid the circularity inherent in the provision of private economic incentives to resolve the collective action problem, in which one collective action problem (the provision of collective goods) begets another (the creation of a system of selective incentives to resolve that problem).
During the late 1960s, the impact of Olson's monograph on the study of entrepreneurship was immediate, especially when 'entrepreneurs' are defined broadly to include actors in the political as well as the business realm. In the revised edition of the book, in 1971, Olson wrote that "some recent writers, in discussions of the difficulty of providing collective goods for unorganized groups, have introduced the idea of the entrepreneur who might help a group obtain a collective good it lacked" (1971: 173). Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970, 1972) , for instance, advocated an "entrepreneurial" theory of political behavior that was developed explicitly based on Olson's ideas. The earliest formulation of such an entrepreneurial theory was advanced by Robert Salisbury (1969) , who distinguished between lead entrepreneurs, who develop an incentive structure for a new organization, and mere supporters, who are offered these incentives at the opportunity cost of organizational membership. In Salisbury's framing, the successful emergence of new organizations hinges on the particular mix of benefits -material, solidary, and expressive -between lead entrepreneurs and supporters. Olson's problem of collective action was thus re-formulated as a problem of exchange within a group.
4
Despite its origin as a theory of economic groups, Olson's theory has since been applied almost exclusively to the formation of groups outside the world of business. 5 As Nownes and Neeley (1996: 122) Some of these contributors have also raised questions about the relevance of Olson's theory of collective action for new business partnerships. Owing to the free rider problem, Schneider and Teske (1992: 741) suggest that the "stereotypical private sector entrepreneur works alone or in a small organization, thus solving collective action problems by avoiding collectivities". By contrast, "a public sector entrepreneur is much more likely to need a collective group foundation to survive and prosper in the political marketplace." Nownes and Neeley (1996) approach the issue from a different angle, suggesting that the free rider thesis may apply to the maintenance of effort in established groups, rather than the elicitation of effort in new ones.
This will be true, in particular, if newly formed organizations tend to receive substantial support from specific patrons, while older organizations rely on the incremental support of a broader set of supporters.
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To test the applicability of the theory of collective action to business partnerships, I
conducted a recent empirical study of entrepreneurial effort (hours worked and additional funds invested) among a nationally representative sample of startups (Ruef 2009b: Chapter 7) . As anticipated by Olson's thesis, effort decreased substantially as the number of owners in an entrepreneurial group grew larger. Olson also argued that the free rider problem could be resolved in face-to-face groups through social pressures created by intimate bonds among participants. In an entrepreneurial context, a particularly important source of such pressure involves the substantial number of ties between spouses and cohabiting (intimate) partners.
Where such ties exist, we expect little free riding among entrepreneurs, since shirking in the amount of time and money devoted to the venture has immediate repercussions in the domestic realm. Consistent with these intuitions, I found that the free rider problem -i.e. the covariation of group size and level of entrepreneurial effort -was absent when a group of business startup owners included intimate partners.
The importance of Olson's theory for the formation of political groups is widely acknowledged, but its implications for entrepreneurial activity in other sectors (e.g. business or social entrepreneurship) would benefit from further attention. Olson's entrepreneur also retains an unusually heroic persona, often serving as a deus ex machina to resolve the (otherwise) unsolvable problem of collective action. This heroic attribution was pursued by Olson himself, when he wrote that the:
ntrepreneur, who is generally trusted (or feared), or who can guess who is bluffing in the bargaining, or who can simply save bargaining time, can sometimes work out an arrangement that is better for all concerned than any outcome that could emerge without entrepreneurial leadership or organization. " (1971: 175) As Olson acknowledged, such heroic visions must be tempered by the constraints on entrepreneurial groups: entrepreneurs "strive mightily to organize large groups ...
[but] many of [these efforts] will come to naught" (176). The puzzle for a theory of collective action is identifying the social conditions and incentives under which entrepreneurs can develop stable and successful groups that produce collective goods.
Theories of Ethnic Enterprise
The last classical theory of entrepreneurial groups that I will review does not derive from the work of a single scholar, but, rather, from the work of a set of sociologists who reinvigorated interest in ethnic enterprise during the early 1970s. On a sporadic basis, one can readily locate earlier articles and monographs on ethnicity and entrepreneurship, such as Rose Lee's (1949) research on the changing organizational structure of Chinatown businesses. In the United States, there was also a sustained intellectual tradition that addressed entrepreneurial activity among into the classic small business occupations with which they have now become identified in the popular mind" (1972: 5-6) . At the same time, blacks, who were located in a similarly disadvantaged social location, lacked a corresponding level of prevalence among small business owners. Quoting Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan on the same point, Light noted that the "complete absence of a business class" among African-Americans was "especially perplexing"
(p. 4).
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According to Light, the theoretical solution to this puzzle lay in group processes.
Descriptively, this could already be seen to some extent in the comparative propensity of Asians and African-Americans to form entrepreneurial groups: "there was a noteworthy tendency of Chinese and Japanese to operate partnerships with more than one owner ... while most of the black stores were solo proprietorships employing no hired labor" (p. 11). This difference in associational propensity may have proven to be minor, had it not also reflected on the ability of entrepreneurs from these different ethnic categories to secure business financing. Light suggested that the Chinese and Japanese had imported institutions -such as rotating credit associations (hu in China and ko in Japan) -which made it easier to capitalize small businesses, while similar (1973: 584) . This group orientation yields an unusually high level of solidarity among middleman minorities, marked by features such as marital homogamy, residential selfsegregation, the perpetuation of a distinct language and education, and an avoidance of political activism in the host society (except when the minority group itself is threatened). For middleman entrepreneurs, in turn, this communal solidarity reinforces "family, regional, dialect, sect, and ultimately ethnic ties" that distribute business credit and information, allow for the recruitment of inexpensive labor, and place informal limits on business competition with co-ethnics (p. 586).
A third component of the classical perspective on ethnic enterprise involves the ecological succession of neighborhoods and how it impacts startup opportunities for entrepreneurs and their co-ethnic partners. Theories of 'ecological succession' -how one ethnic population in a neighborhood (or other urban region) replaces another -could be traced back to the Chicago School of Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and their collaborators in the 1920s and 30s (Aldrich 1975 (Aldrich 1975: 339) . Ethnic business enterprises may also be dependent on other 'new' ethnic organizations -newspapers, churches, and voluntary associations -to attract business partners, workers, and customers or, more generally, to promote their efforts within the local community.
Though pioneered over thirty years ago, theories of ethnic enterprise have inspired a rich and cumulative body of scholarship. It will not be possible in the remainder of this section to review the numerous branches of this literature exhaustively (see Aldrich and Waldinger [1990] and Light [2005] for useful summaries). One area of intense empirical and theoretical attention has involved the entrepreneurial groups that arise from ethnic enclaves. Empirical debates in this area have often centered on the question as to whether the segregation and solidarity associated with ethnic enclaves generates economic benefits for immigrants; and, in particular, whether these benefits differ between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Sanders and Nee 1987; Portes and Jensen 1989; Portes and Zhou 1996) . Theoretical refinement of the enclave concept has emphasized the co-occurrence of ethnic enterprises in a given geographic locale and the implications this generates for social networks among entrepreneurs and their co-ethnic employees (Portes and Shafer 2007) .
Recent work on ethnic identity and social networks has also considered the cross-national character of many ethnic entrepreneurial groups. As Alejandro Portes and his colleagues note, 
Conclusion
If the classical perspectives on entrepreneurial groups had since fallen into disuse, then this review would be largely of historical interest. But, as the preceding discussion has suggested, contemporary observers of new business and political ventures continue to draw extensively on the legacy of Simmel, Coase, and Olson, as well as the theories of ethnic enterprise developed in the 1970s by Light, Bonacich, and Aldrich. In this concluding section, I will seek to identify the central questions that animate these perspectives and how they relate to one another. I will also address some respects in which the classical perspectives are underutilized by research on "founding teams" that appears in specialized entrepreneurship journals. economics (or, in the latter case, perhaps political economy), and thus has a stronger emphasis on the incentives and costs incurred among participants, as well as the 'productivity' of entrepreneurial groups as a whole. While these disciplines sometimes share explanatory variables, the outcomes they highlight tend to be distinctive. For instance, both Simmel and
Olson consider size to be a crucial feature of entrepreneurial groups. In Simmel's structural sociology, the question is how the increasing size of a group will affect its level of internal cohesion and conflict. In Olson's logic of collective action, the question is how the increasing size of a group will affect the level of entrepreneurial effort on the part of each participant.
The other distinction among the classical perspectives is more subtle, pertaining to their tendency to address features of group structure as a whole (e.g. size, heterogeneity, relational composition) or features of the individual members or transactions that constitute a group Contemporary Example: Greif (2006) 
